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ABSTRACT
Arguments can be made on both sides of the question of whether a stringent, global
corporate environmental standard represents a competitive asset or liability for
multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing in emerging and developing markets.  This
paper seeks to answer this question by analyzing the global environmental standards of a
large sample of US-based MNEs in relation to their market performance.  We find that
firms adopting a single, stringent global environmental standard have higher market
values, as measured by Tobin’s q, than firms defaulting to less stringent, or poorly
enforced host country standards.  Thus, developing countries that use lax environmental
regulations to attract foreign direct investment end up attracting poorer quality, and
perhaps, less competitive firms.  Our results also suggest that externalities are
incorporated to a significant extent in firm valuation.  We discuss plausible reasons for
this observation.4
I. INTRODUCTION
Global companies have become major players on the world stage.  There are now in
excess of 40,000 multinational enterprises (MNEs) with some 250,000 foreign affiliates,
investing more than $200 billion abroad each year (UNCTAD, 1995).  About 40% of
world trade consists of intrafirm transfers of materials and components within MNEs
(Greider, 1997).  The ten largest MNEs have annual sales in excess of the gross national
products of the 100 smallest countries in the world (Hawken, 1993, p. 92).  Foreign direct
investment (FDI) now exceeds official development assistance by a factor of five
whereas five years ago it was less than half (Wolfensohn, 1997).
MNEs create, leverage, and arbitrage capabilities at a world scale.  They are
known to make positive contributions in economic efficiency (see, e.g., Caves, 1996, Ch.
7) and serve as a conduit for the globalization of economies.  However, MNEs have also
proven elusive of public policy controls because of their economic power and ability to
shift resources and production across borders.  Questions have been raised concerning
MNEs' social and environmental performance.  Social critics have argued that MNEs, in
seeking to reduce costs, play off employees and countries against one another, creating
downward pressure on wages and social standards on a worldwide basis (Gladwin, 1987,
Gladwin, Kennelly and Krause 1995; Greider, 1997).
Our focus is on the environmental aspect.  Environmentalists contend that MNEs
are engaging in flight to “pollution havens” by moving dirty operations to countries
where regulatory standards are less stringent (Daly, 1994).  Through flight to pollution
havens, MNEs can avoid expensive pollution controls, cut costs by recapitalizing old
equipment, and continue to make products that are no longer considered environmentally
acceptable in the more highly regulated markets of the developed world (Vernon, 1992).
Over time, it is claimed that these practices lead to a “race to the bottom” as nations and
localities vie for plants and facilities that seek only to minimize cost and externalize
environmental responsibility (Korten, 1995).
While some MNEs clearly utilize such practices, it is unclear whether there is
systematic advantage in racing to the bottom.  There appear to be forces that encourage
MNEs to integrate and standardize their environmental practices globally.  Indeed, it may
make business sense in some cases to adopt global standards that exceed those required5
by some local laws or regulations; especially when environmental laws and regulations
become more stringent as an economy grows.  By investing in state-of-the-art technology
and processes in developing countries, MNE facilities may be able to achieve
simultaneously world class cost, quality, and environmental performance.  In addition,
MNE's may reap standardization benefits and other intangible advantages like positive
reputation effects.
In this paper, we therefore seek an empirical answer to an intriguing and
important question: Is firm value linked to an MNE’s environmental standard?  We
analyze the corporate environmental standards of a large sample of US-based MNEs in
relation to their market performance.  Specifically, we examine whether adopting a
single, stringent, corporate environmental standard enhances firm value compared to
those MNEs defaulting to less stringent, or poorly enforced host country standards.
We find that firms adopting a stringent global environmental standard have higher
market values, as measured by Tobin’s q (market value over replacement costs of
tangible assets).  However, we can not identify with our data any causal (time series)
relationships between either past changes in environmental standards and current change
in firm value or past change in firm value and current change in environmental standards.
This leads to another question: What drives firms to upgrade their environmental
standards?  The answer to this question awaits further investigation.
Our results have some important implications.  First, the results in this study and
others (e.g., Hamilton, 1995; White, 1995; and Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996) suggest
that the market valuation of firms internalizes environmental externalities.  It appears that
investors attach a higher value to firms that aim to produce fewer environmental
externalities.  In fact, the increase in market value associated with adopting stringent
global environmental standards is quite considerable.  The magnitude of the increase
would appear to reflect more than just lower environmental liabilities.  Consistent with
other studies (e.g., Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997), the increase we
observe indicates that adopting stringent global environmental standards is actually a
more profitable strategy than "racing to the bottom."
These results question whether MNEs are systematically defaulting to lower
environmental standards in a global context and whether there is any advantage in doing6
so.  On the contrary, our results suggest that poorer performing MNEs tend to default to
less stringent environment standards.  Thus, developing countries that use lax
environmental regulations to attract foreign direct investment end up attracting poorer
quality, and perhaps, less competitive firms.
In the next section, we describe prior research linked to the current work that is
helpful in interpreting our results.  In the third section, we discuss theory and propose our
research questions.  We present our methodology in Section IV and results in Section V.
Discussion of the results and conclusions are contained in Sections VI and VII,
respectively.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH
A growing body of literature ties superior environmental performance to financial
performance (e.g. Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Hart, 1995).  For example, three recent
studies link proactive environmental management to superior stock performance:
Hamilton (1995), White (1995), and Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) all use event study
methodology to demonstrate that (1) news of high levels of toxic emissions result in
significant negative abnormal returns; (2) firms with strong environmental management
practices have better stock price returns than firms with poor practices after a major
environmental disaster, such as the Exxon Valdez accident; and (3) environmental
performance awards result in significant positive abnormal returns.  The first and second
results indicate that investors expect that firms incur non-trivial costs for environmental
clean up and that these costs are lower for firms with better environmental records.  The
third result suggests that recognition of environmental performance has a positive
reputation effect
1 which possibly augments firm value.
Feldman, Soyka, and Ameer (1996) analyze a sample of 300 large public
companies in the US to see if investments in environmental management lead to reduced
risk, and if such risk reduction is valued by financial markets.  Their findings suggest that
investments in environmental management lead to substantial reduction in perceived risk
                                                          
1 The positive reputation effect may include not just investors' impression of a firm's environmental
performance; it may also include investors' impression of a firm's management quality.7
of a firm, with an accompanying increase in a public company’s stock price, of perhaps
five percent.
Other scholars have examined the relationship between environmental and
operating performance.  Cohen et al. (1995), for example, demonstrate a strong
correlation between environmental performance and firm profitability.  Similarly, Hart
and Ahuja (1996) present evidence indicating that efforts to prevent pollution and reduce
emissions are positively associated with the “bottom line” (as measured by return on
sales and return on assets) within one to two years of initiation and that those firms with
the highest emission levels stand the most to gain.  Russo and Fouts (1997) in their study
of 243 firms, find that environmental performance and return on assets (ROA) are
positively linked, and that industry growth moderates this relationship, with returns to
environmental performance higher for high-growth industries.  Finally, Nehrt (1996)
examines the relationship between timing and intensity of investment in pollution
prevention and growth in profits within a sample of 50 pulp and paper companies.  His
results indicate a positive relationship between early movers in pollution prevention and
profit growth.
While results are generally convergent, most empirical work to date has been
restricted to MNEs’ environmental performance in the US or Western Europe where data
are more available regarding environmental performance (e.g. Kennelly, 1996).  There
has been some conceptual and case study treatment of MNE environmental performance
in foreign contexts and developing countries (e.g. Gladwin, 1987; Korten, 1995; Hart,
1997), but little empirical research on this dimension has been conducted.  The limited
empirical work that has been done suggests that MNEs are more environmentally
responsible than their local competitors in developing countries (Eskeland and Harrison,
1997), but the evidence regarding MNE social performance is mixed (e.g. Zahra, Oviatt
and Minyard, 1993; Johnson and Greening, 1994).  We were unable to find any published
empirical research relating specifically to the question of how MNE international
environmental standards, particularly their behavior in developing countries, affect firm
market value.  It is to that question that we now turn our attention.
III. THEORY8
Arguments can be made on both sides of the question of whether a stringent, global
corporate environmental standard represents a competitive asset or liability for MNEs.
Below, we articulate the major theoretical lenses on either side of the argument.
Global Environmental Standards as Altruistic Liability
Conventional economic logic suggests that, ceteris paribus, in countries where
environmental regulation is either lax or not enforced, it is cheaper to operate than in
countries where strict environmental regulations result in fines, liabilities, and
administrative or legal action against polluters (Stewart, 1993).  For example, the annual
cost of complying with environmental regulation in the US now exceeds $125 billion, or
about 2.1% of GDP.  In most developing countries, environmental spending represents
only a fraction of 1% of GDP (Jaffe et al, 1995).  Evidence also suggests that strict
pollution control regulations in the US may have an adverse impact on productivity (Gray
and Shardbegian (1993), perhaps by forcing companies to commit resources and
manpower to non-productive uses such as environmental auditing, waste treatment and
litigation (Haveman and Christiansen, 1981).  Hence, when operating in countries with
less stringent or poorly enforced environmental regulations, defaulting to local standards
reduces costs.
Furthermore, by defaulting to local standards in countries with lax regulation or
enforcement, companies may be able to re-capitalize old equipment that is no longer
acceptable in more regulated markets, thereby lowering costs even further.  Companies
can also market products in such countries that may be discouraged or even banned for
environmental reasons in more regulated markets, thereby extending product life cycles
and revenue streams (Vernon, 1992; Korten, 1995).
In short, there may be considerable financial penalties associated with overly
general or constraining environmental policies in response to standardized criteria when
it is not really needed or justified (Rondinelli and Vastag, 1996).  Overall, the
presumption is that defaulting to local standards is cost-saving and that adhering to more
stringent environmental standards where they are not required or enforced is wasteful.
Firms that are altruistic in their attempts to achieve higher environmental standards when9
investing in low-standard countries are not serving their shareholders.  The behavior hurts
market value and may be a reflection of managerial idiosyncrasies.
Global Environmental Standards as Value-Adding Asset
A competing logic suggests that value-seeking investors may view defaulting to lower or
poorly enforced local environmental standards as counterproductive to long-term
performance.  First, the cost savings associated with lower environmental standards may
be exaggerated and may not even exist: MNEs often find that they have to pay for the
remediation of environmental damages even if they are in full compliance with local
regulations and requirements, often due to pressures from environmental interest groups
or international organizations (e.g. World Bank).  Such clean up costs can be significant.
Second, in making new investments, a firm may find that moving downward from
accustomed higher standards violates established corporate routines and is actually more
costly than adhering to the higher standards, even in the absence of regulation.  By
specifying a single corporate standard, performance monitoring and evaluation costs
might be reduced since a single set of values, specifications, and procedures can be
deployed throughout the world, without the need to consider local deviations from the
norm.  Global standardization will also mean that production improvements made in one
location can readily be transferred to all subsidiaries.  Global strategies leverage the
return on investment in improvements made in high environmental standard regions
across all geographic locations (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).
Thus, adopting a single, stringent environmental standard is consistent with pursuit of
global competitive strategies by MNEs (Christmann, 1998).
Third, while adequate environmental standards may not yet exist in many
developing countries, it can be argued that in the not-too-distant future, standards will
rise as income increases and people become more sensitive toward and concerned about
environmental deterioration.  This pattern of environmental regulation following GDP
growth has already been observed among newly industrialized nations such as Taiwan,
Korea, and Singapore (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).  In other words, there may be an
important future benefit to adopting a single global standard if the productive life of
capital extends beyond the period of lax or poorly enforced regulation.10
When the environmental standards in developing countries improve with
increases in per-capita income, firms performing above current requirements will not
need additional investment while firms defaulting to the current minimums will need to
re-invest to conform to the heightened requirements.  A foresighted firm could take
advantage of this by adopting higher environmental standards than are dictated by current
regulations.  MNEs are especially well-positioned in this regard: They can actually use
the environment as a strategic competitive advantage by speeding up the process (e.g. by
lobbying for tighter environmental regulations) and thus out-compete local firms with
lesser financial means, knowledge, and capability.
Fourth, the presumption that polluting lowers production cost can be challenged.
Putting aside the issue of regulatory stringency, there are other ways in which
environmental standards may affect competitiveness.  Specifically, not all environmental
regulations affect firms’ behavior in the same manner, and the form of environmental
regulation can be an important determinant of business impact.  For example, US
environmental regulations often mandate specific control or treatment technologies.
These so-called “command and control” style regulations dictate that specific pollution
control technologies be used, often at an exorbitant cost (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
However, in many cases, it is possible to reduce or eliminate pollution by making
changes in the manufacturing or production process, rather than capturing pollutants for
treatment or disposal at the “end-of-the-pipe.”  Pollution and waste are reduced at the
outset by a conscious effort to heighten resource efficiency.  Many state-of-the-art
technologies have high resource productivity.  Such “eco-efficiency” can actually lower
operating costs, rather than raise them (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Hart and Ahuja,
1996).
Finally, there may be fringe benefits associated with adhering to higher
environmental standards.  By committing to standards that exceed those of the host
country, the company might benefit from heightened employee morale and thus
productivity (Romm, 1993).  Adopting an internal corporate environmental standard
ahead of legal requirements avoids special interest group pressures and may result in
positive reputation effects for the firm, improving its public image relative to
competitors.11
These considerations suggest that a firm defaulting to lower or poorly enforced
local environmental standards may be overlooking both tangible and intangible benefits
associated with conforming to a higher global standard.  Firms conforming to a higher
global environmental standard may find that the strategy enhances value.
Value Creation or Destruction?
The conflicting nature of the above arguments suggests that the relationship between
corporate environmental standards and firm value is an empirical question.  We therefore
investigate two questions:
1. Are MNEs which exceed local environment standards (those adopting higher global
standards) higher or lower value firms?  Is adhering to higher global environmental
standards associated with higher market value or does it represent a non-productive
use of assets and a drag on market value?
2. Is there a detectable lead-lag relationship between firm value and environmental
standards?  In other words, do changes in environmental standards cause changes in
market value or visa versa?
IV. METHODS
Sample
The sample of firms for this study was drawn from the US Standard and Poor’s 500 list
of corporations.  Although this population of firms is clearly biased towards the largest
firms, this was not deemed to be a problem since MNEs were our target sample and the
S&P 500 contains largely MNEs.  Our sample period was from 1994 to 1997.  This is the
period in which we have data both on firm environmental standards and market value.
Although the data source for our environmental standards (Investor Responsibility
Research Center’s (IRRC) Corporate Environmental Profile) collected data prior to 1994,
the survey item that we draw upon changed in 1994, making comparison with prior
years’ data inappropriate.12
Two screens were applied in selecting firms.  First, only those MNEs involved in
manufacturing or mining (SIC codes between 2000 and 4000) were selected because the
main research variable, corporate environmental standards, was most salient to these
firms.  Second, only those MNEs with production operations in countries with GDP per
capita below $8,000 (1985 dollars) were included in the study.  Evidence suggests that
concern for and activity in environmental regulation decreases dramatically for countries
with per capita income levels below $8,000 (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).  Sampling on
this dimension therefore allows us to insure that there is a difference between those firms
that default to local standards and those that adopt a global standard.
After applying these two screens to the population, we ended up with 86 firms,
which were drawn from fifteen two-digit SIC codes.
Dependent Variable
The key dependent variable (Tobin’s q) is defined as firm market value per dollar of
replacement costs of tangible assets.  Tobin’s q is widely used as an indicator of
intangible value in economics research (e.g., Lindenberg and Ross, 1981) and in the
international business literature (e.g., Morck and Yeung, 1991).  We proxied for firm
market value by summing Compustat reported firm equity value (outstanding shares
times share price), book value of long term debt, and net current liabilities.  We proxied
for replacement costs of tangible assets by summing book value of inventory and net
value of physical plant and equipment.
2
Independent Variables
The focal independent variable, Environmental Standard (ENV STD), was derived from
the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC) Corporate Environmental Profile.
This data set describes each corporation’s posture with regard to international
environmental performance.  Each firm is allowed to check any of the following three
categories: (1) the corporation adheres to local standards only;  (2) the corporation
                                                          
2 A more elaborate estimate for Tobin’s q (e.g. Lindenberg and Ross, 1981) and the current simplified
estimate often yield qualitatively similar results.  The key is whether the use of book- instead of market-
value of debts, of inventory, and of plant and equipment introduces any systematic biases.  Such biases are
likely linked to industry and firm size.  We incorporate industry effects in our statistical analyses in case
there are any systematic biases linked to industries.  We control for firm size by using the logarithm of the
firm’s assets in a given year.13
applies US environmental standards wherever it does business; and (3) the corporation
has its own internal environmental standard that exceeds any national standard.  Each
firm was then coded as either category 1, 2, or 3 for each of the years 1994 to 1997.
The implicit assumption is that firms declaring a lower category of environmental
standard pollute more.  This assumption requires validation.  Full scale validation is
difficult because consistent and reliable pollution data on a global scale does not exist,
especially in developing countries (the presumed “pollution havens”).  We therefore
resorted to validating the assumption based on each firm's US "Toxic Release Inventory"
(TRI).  The IRRC tracks US plants' TRI emissions (by weight) and reports for each
company its ratio of toxic releases to sales and its industry average.  We examined the
difference between a firm's US toxic release/sales and its industry average.  We found
that firms that "adheres to local standards only" pollute more than the industry average
while the opposite was true for companies that claim to apply "U.S. environmental
standards" or their “own internal standard that exceeds any national standard.” Firms that
"adhere to local standards" pollute the most while firms that "apply an internal global
standard that exceeds any national standard" pollute the least.  The difference between
the pollution by the first and the third group is most statistically significant.  Details on
the validating effort are reported in the appendix.
To avoid the missing variable problem, we needed to include controls known to
affect Tobin’s q that are also plausibly related to a firm’s choice of environmental
standards.  Tobin’s q is known to be related to capital structure, intangibles like R&D and
advertising expenditures, and multinationality (e.g. Morck and Yeung, 1991).  Hence, we
included in our regression analyses the following control variables: R&D intensity
(R&D/dollars of total assets), advertising intensity (ADV/dollars of total assets), leverage
(long-term debt/dollars of total assets), and multinationality (percent of foreign assets
/dollars of total assets).
3  We also included firm size (defined as the log of total dollars of
assets) to control for the possibility that firm size is related with Tobin’s q.
4  All data
                                                          
3 We also used the percentage of foreign sales as an alternative specification of multinationality.  The
results were in all cases not significantly different from those obtained using the percentage of foreign
assets.
4 There are other variables that are known to affect Tobin's q.  First, there may be industry level effects like
competitive structure and growth potential.  We filter out these industry level effects by running fixed
effects models.  There are also other known firm level effects that affect Tobin's q.  One of these would be14
were obtained from Compustat data tapes for the years 1994-1997, except
multinationality, which was obtained from Worldscope.
It is expected that these control variables are correlated with a firm’s choice of
environmental standards.  For example, large and more internationally-oriented firms are
likely to be highly conscious of their public image because of the large scale and scope of
any negative ramification from bad publicity.  Firms engaged in extensive R&D are
likely to be more aware of environmental problems and the likely course of future
developments.  Highly leveraged firms may be less able to afford the investment required
to implement more stringent global environmental standards.
Data Analysis
We used both bivariate and multivariate analyses to address the research
questions.  With regard to the first question, we identified the statistical relationship
between long-run firm value and level of corporate environmental standard using t-tests
and multiple regression.  In our analyses, we controlled for industry effects and relevant
firm characteristics that are known to affect firm value.  We recognize that using the
panel data entails counting firms with unchanged environmental standard multiple times,
which exaggerates sample size and thus the t-statistics.  We have corrected for this by
replacing the firm-year data with firm-period-average data.
To create the firm-period-average data, we averaged the dependent and
independent variables for each year in which the firm reported a given environmental
standard.  Thus, a firm that used host country standards in every year would have one
observation in the firm-period-average data, while a firm that changed from host to U.S.
standards would have two observations — one for each of the environmental standards.
5
                                                                                                                                                                            
growth trends.  However, one runs the risks of double counting the growth effect if investment in
intangibles is already incorporated.  Product diversification can also affect Tobin's q.  Product
diversification is highly correlated with geographic diversification.  Excluding either one is not going to
affect the behavior of the other one, however, as the comparison between Morck and Yeung (1998, Table
2) and Morck and Yeung (1991, Tables 4 and 5) illustrates.  To conserve the degrees of freedom and to
avoid collinearity, we do not include these extra explanatory variables.  Following a referee's suggestion,
we include the log of size (total dollars of assets) as an independent variable.
5 In conducting regression analyses on the relationship between Tobin's q and environmental standards,
another way to analyze the data would be to have all observations put into our regressions while controlling
for firm fixed effects using a GLS approach.  We opted not to do so because for a very large proportion of
our sample firms the focal independent variable (environmental standard) does not have much variation.  It
is well known under such circumstances that the GLS approach does not significantly improve efficiency15
Out of our 86 firms, 69 never changed their environmental standards while 17 made
changes, including multiple changes.  The total number of changes is 18, 12 were
positive (upgrading environmental standards) while 6 were negative (downgrading
environmental standards).  Hence, there are 104 (86 + 12 + 6) firm-period-average
observations.  There were 6 missing "environmental standards" data in our sample period.
With regard to the second question, we used the Granger causality method which
involves regressing, in turn, a) firm value on its own lags and past environmental
standard; and b) environmental standard on its own lags and past firm value.  When we
performed the causality tests, we used the panel data, rather than the firm-period-average
data.  When past changes in environmental standards predict current changes in market
value but past changes in market value do not explain current changes in environmental
standards, we can conclude that adopting a higher environmental standard causes
increased market value.  When the reverse is true, we can conclude that higher firm value
causes adoption of more stringent global environmental standards.
6
V. RESULTS
Table I presents means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables based on
firm-period-average data in our study.  As expected, we find a positive correlation
between a firm’s Tobin's q and its levels of research and development and advertising,
and its multinationality.  Likewise, a negative correlation is found between the Tobin's q
value and the leverage of the firm.  We now turn to consideration of our two research
questions.
*** Insert Table I About Here ***
Are High Environmental Standards and Market Value Compatible?
The key result in Table I is that ENV STD is positively and significantly correlated with
Tobin's q, as well as R&D, advertising, log (assets) and multinationality (only at the 10%
                                                                                                                                                                            
(see, e.g., Theil, 1971, Ch. 7).
6 It is possible that the causality test may not be very effective because of the limited number of changes in
corporate environmental standard.  Our sample has for 86 firms four years worth of data with 6 missing
readings.  Therefore there are 252 (3x86 - 6) possible changes in corporate environmental standard.  The16
1-tail level), and negatively correlated with the indebtedness (leverage) of the firm.
These data provide preliminary evidence that those companies adopting higher
environmental standards globally also have higher levels of market value.
To better understand the differences in the characteristics of the firms, we present,
in Table II, the results of t-tests for the differences between the means of Tobin’s q,
R&D, advertising, leverage, and multinationality at the three levels of environmental
standards (see Table II).  The first interesting observation in Table II is that defaulting to
local environmental standards is by no means the most common practice (only 30 out of
104 fit this description).  Rather, the most common strategy in this sample is to adopt a
stringent internal standard that is applied globally (56 out of 104 observations).
The t-tests reveal that those companies which use U.S. standards world-wide have
insignificantly higher Tobin's q values than those companies which use the standards of
the various host countries in which they operate.  (But the t statistic is significant at the
10% level, 1-tail.)  However, the firms that employ their own internal standard around the
world have significantly higher Tobin's q values than those that use U.S. standards.  The
remaining t-tests in Table II indicate that the firms that use host, U.S., or internal
environmental standards have roughly equal levels of R&D and advertising.  However,
firms using host country environmental standards are most leveraged while firms using
internal environmental standards are the largest and attain the highest level of
multinationality.
*** Insert Table II About Here ***
Of course, none of the analysis presented thus far controls for factors that may be
driving the observed relationships.  In particular, there could be industry effects present.
For example, some industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals, where firms have generally high
Tobin’s q values) utilize highly toxic chemicals and materials so that firms in these
industries are more likely to adopt higher environmental standards.  In the multivariate
analyses that follow, therefore, we control for industry effects.
                                                                                                                                                                            
actual number of changes, however, is only 18.17
Table III presents the results of multivariate regression analyses based on firm-
period-average data.  The dependent variable is the firm’s Tobin-q.  The models
presented in the columns of Table III, respectively, control for no fixed effects and for
industry fixed effects.
7  In each model, we control for the level of firm debt, R&D,
advertising, and multinationality which all enter as the average for the past three years.
*** Insert Table III About Here ***
In both models, the control variables have the expected signs: Leverage has a
negative but insignificant coefficient.  "Research and development" and "advertising"
each have a positive and significant effect on firm value.  The degree of foreign market
participation does not have a significant effect in any model.  Given that our sample firms
are all very large MNEs, the lack of significance of the multinationality variable is not
surprising.
Our focal independent variable is the level of corporate environmental standard a
firm employs (ENV STD).  The results in Table III suggest that higher levels of ENV
STD are strongly related to Tobin's q.  The fact that the ENV STD coefficient remains
positive and significant when we control for industry fixed effects indicates that the
correlation between Tobin's q and ENV STD is not an artifact of industry (in fact, an F-
test reveals that the industry effects are insignificant).  Thus, we have evidence that intra-
industry variation in environmental standards by itself has a positive influence on firm
value.
In Table III, we have used the ENV STD variable with its original coding of 1, 2
or 3, representing host, U.S. and internal global standards respectively.  Treating an
ordinal variable in this manner forces the difference between a host and a U.S. standard
to have the same impact on Tobin’s q as the difference between a U.S. and internal
standard.  This is not necessarily the case, and in our next model specification, we use a
piece-wise linear regression that allows us to relax this assumption.
                                                          
7 To control for industry fixed effects, we use two-digit SIC industry dummies.  It is possible to use three-
digit SIC industry dummies and doing so does not change our results.  However, there are some three-digit
SIC industries with very few firms (some have only one).  To avoid this potential problem, we opt to report
results based on two-digit SIC industry dummies.18
Table IV reports the piece-wise regression results.  We used ENV STD to create
two dummy variables.  The first, ED1, took on a value of ‘1’ if the original standards
variable was above or equal to ‘2’ (US standards), and the dummy was set to ‘0’ if ENV
STD was ‘1’.  The second dummy (ED2) took on a value of ‘1’ if the original standards
variable was ‘3’ (global standard) otherwise it was set to ‘0’.  Hence, the impact of
adopting an internal global standard (i.e. ‘3’ on ENV STD) on Tobin’s q is equal to the
sum of the regression coefficients for ED1 and ED2.  The impact of adopting a US
standard (i.e. ‘2’ on ENV STD) on Tobin’s q is equal to the regression coefficient of ED1
only.
*** Insert Table IV About Here ***
The coefficient on ED1 indicates whether firms using U.S. standards overseas
have higher Tobin's q values than those using host country standards.  The coefficient is
negative but not significant, indicating that those companies that use U.S. standards
overseas do not have significantly higher market values than the companies that use the
standards of the host countries.
The coefficient on ED2 indicates whether the firms using internal global
standards overseas have higher values of Tobin's q than those using U.S. standards.  The
coefficient on ED2 is positive and significant (5%, 2 tails) in both models.  An F-test
reveals that the sum of the coefficient of ED1 and ED2 is significantly above zero,
indicating that firms using a stringent internal environmental standard globally have
statistically higher Tobin's q than those using host country standards.  The results in
Table IV thus indicate that the value generated by global environmental standards is
driven by those firms that use a single, stringent internally-defined global standard, rather
than the firms that use the U.S. standard overseas.
We checked the robustness of our results.  We first conducted residual diagnostics
of our regression results in both Tables III and IV.  We found no outliers whose deletion
materially affects the results of our regression analyses.  Heteroskedasticity is a concern
with our data, as we are analyzing firm-period means, where the number of observations
from which the means are derived is not fixed.  Accordingly, we conducted White's19
(1980) specification test, and determined that heteroskedasticity is not affecting our
results.  Finally, instead of using sample average data, we repeated our statistical analyses
using year by year data, one year's worth of data per run.  We found qualitatively similar
results.
Thus far, we have explored the relationship between firms’ environmental
standards and their market valuation as represented by Tobin's q.  We have found that
there is a reliable positive and significant relationship between the use of a single global
environmental standard and Tobin's q.
Do Higher Environmental Standards Cause Increases in Market Value?
Our next step is to explore causality in this relationship using the original time series
panel data.  Does upgrading the firm’s environmental standards lead to higher firm value
(higher Tobin's q)?  Or, is it the case that increases in a firm’s Tobin's q result in higher
environmental standards?
To address this question, we first regress Tobin's q on the five control variables
used in earlier regression runs.  We then do the same for our environmental standards
variable (Table Va).  The residuals from these regression runs comprise the portion of
Tobin's q and environmental standards respectively not explained by R&D, advertising,
leverage, total assets, and multinationality.  We then regress these Tobin's q residuals for
a given firm on the lagged values of the Tobin’s q residual and the lagged values of the
environmental standards’ residual.  We do not know what time length, if any, will be
appropriate for the lag effect to be noticeable, so we present one, two, and three year lags
in Tables Va and Vb.
*** Insert Table Va about here ***
The results in Table Va indicate that the previous years’ environmental standards
are not significant predictors of current Tobin's q values.
8  We tried several alternative
                                                          
8 We recognize that the “unit root” problem may be present in our results in Table Va and Vb, because in
each case, the coefficient on the one-year lagged values of the dependent variable are not significantly
different from 1.0.  We attempted a first-difference analysis in order to correct for this potential problem,
but this leaves us with only 42 observations in one year and may thus have the usual small sample20
specifications for assessing whether a change in environmental standards led to a change
in Tobin's q in future years.  All results consistently showed that there is no lagged
reaction to environmental standards on the part of the market.  One interpretation is that
our sample data have too few changes in environmental standards (only 17 firms out of
86 firms did so) to be able to generate statistically reliable results.  Another interpretation
is that the stock market upgrades a firm’s market value within an annual time window
once the firm adopts a higher environmental standard.
9  Thus, a change in environmental
standard does not influence future firm value because firm value has already been
increased in the year the higher environmental standard is adopted.
We also looked to see whether firms that had changes in market valuations altered
their environmental standards in subsequent years, but there was no evidence that such a
link existed (see Table Vb).
*** Insert Table Vb about here ***
In summary, we have found a significant and positive relationship between the
market value of a company (as measured by Tobin's q) and the level of environmental
standard it uses.  This effect remains even after we have controlled for industry effects as
well as other factors known to affect Tobin's q.  Furthermore, our results suggest that a
firm’s market value appreciates quickly once a firm adopts a higher environmental
standard.  However, past changes in market value do not predict whether a firm will
adopt higher environmental standards in the future.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our finding that higher global environmental standards augment firm value is open to
several possible interpretations.  First, it may be that private valuations internalize
environmental externalities: the less negative externalities a firm imposes, the higher the
firm value.  Second, it is possible that adopting stringent environmental standards is
                                                                                                                                                                            
difficulties.  The results of the first-difference analysis do not contradict our reported findings.
9 As long as firm valuation is based on expectations, our result is not inconsistent with results obtained by,
e.g., Hart and Ahuja (1996) which show that efforts to prevent pollution and reduce emissions leads to an
increase in return on sales and assets after one or two years.21
actually more profitable than defaulting to lower or poorly enforced local environmental
standards.  Finally, firms with poorer financial performance may tend to adopt lower
environmental standards.  In this section, we discuss each of these interpretations.
Internalization of externalities
The first interpretation is based not only on our data, but also on the results of other
studies (e.g. Hamilton, 1995; White, 1995; and Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).  All
these results suggest that investors incorporate potential environmental problems and
liabilities into their pricing of companies.  In developed economies with strong regulatory
regimes, the mechanism exists to support this observation: The institutional and legal
systems support the public's right to a clean environment so that polluters have to pay for
their environmental damage.  Hence, firms that have higher potential environmental
liabilities realize lower market values.
The focus of this study (developing countries), however, involves locations where
environmental regulations are lax or property rights to a clean environment are poorly
enforced.  In these contexts, other mechanisms must be at work.  One possible
mechanism for the internalization of externalities under these circumstances is as follows:
Interest groups and non-governmental organizations expose unsound corporate
environmental practices, raise consumer awareness, and put pressure on governments to
discipline polluters even if the pollution is in overseas locations.  Through these means
poor environmental performance is translated into bad public image, lower consumer
goodwill, and ultimately, lower firm value.  For example, the Economist (1996) reported
that:
"In Malaysia, a $5.5 billion hydroelectric dam to be built by a consortium including
ABB Asea Brown Boveri, a Swiss-based multinational, is being attacked by local
people and western environmental groups for destroying rainforest.  ..........  The
average oil baron or mining boss might once have shrugged off such events as little
local difficulties. Some even relished a brawl. Nowadays, they recognise that the
stakes are higher. It is not only the prospect of consumer boycotts that worries them.
In addition, staff morale can suffer (many Shell employees opposed the sinking of the
Brent Spar), political contacts can be upset (Nelson Mandela denounced Shell's22
behaviour in Nigeria) and worst of all sanctions can be imposed (the state of
Massachusetts recently banned contracts with firms doing business in Myanmar)."
Aware of this disciplinary effect, managers opt to maintain a high level of environmental
practice, even where regulations do not require it.
Bottom line benefits
There appears to be economic implications of adopting high environmental standards that
extend beyond the negative or “disciplinary” effects associated with poor environmental
performance discussed above.  In fact, the coefficient for ED2 (Table IV) indicates that
firms using their own stringent global environmental standards have a Tobin’s q that is
approximately 1.17 higher than those using U.S. standards abroad.  Given the mean value
of firm tangible assets in our sample, 1.17 represents more than $10 billion per firm.
Even company estimates of the cost (including punitive damages) of the largest
environmental clean up in history (the Exxon Valdez accident) are less than $8 billion
(The Lamp, 1999).  The magnitude of the value increase associated with higher
environmental standards thus represents more than just the monetarization of negative
externalities.
We therefore advance our second interpretation: adopting stringent environmental
standards is more profitable than defaulting to lower or poorly enforced local
environmental standards.  This interpretation is consistent with other studies (e.g., Cohen
et al., 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; and Russo and Fouts, 1997), all of which suggest a
higher level of profitability associated with better environmental practices and efforts to
reduce emissions and waste.
We need to be careful, however, in explaining how stringent environmental
standards might raise performance.  Two possible mechanisms apply.  First, it may be
that adopting the latest technologies and equipment increases productivity, and that is
what makes the investment worthwhile.  Better environmental practices are embedded in
the latest technologies, given pressures from interest groups and governments in
developed countries.  From this perspective, the contribution of high environmental
standards to bottom line performance is coincidental: the effect would not be present
were it not for societal pressures to develop more environmental friendly technologies23
and equipment.  One would expect early movers to see the biggest gains from such
investments, as Nehrt (1996) reports.  Over time, companies not able to keep up with the
investments would evidence erosion in bottom line performance and firm value.
10
A second, internally-driven mechanism may also be at work, however.  Firms that
adopt high environmental standards strive to search for eco-efficient production systems.
The conscious policy to pursue technologies and processes that increase the resource
productivity of their operations has a positive result for the bottom line.
11
Low performers race to the bottom
Tobin's q can be interpreted as a measure of "firm quality."  One can therefore interpret
our results as suggesting that “quality” firms adopt high environmental standards
independent of local requirements, while lower quality firms engage in a “race to the
bottom,” as a means of gaining short term financial advantage.  High performing firms
are typically more focused on corporate goals and competitive position.  The application
of a stringent, global environmental standard may thus be indicative of a desire to build
organizational awareness, amongst all affiliates, of company policies and practices.  It
may also be an indicator that a company, as an industry leader, aims to stay on top in all
aspects of its business.
There are still other possible explanations for the linkage between firm quality
and firm environmental standard.  For example, it is possible that better firms have the
foresight to plan for the future: they see the importance of applying high environmental
standards even where not required because the standards will increase as a region grows
and develops.  It is also possible that higher performing firms simply have the resources
to invest in higher environment standards.  They use environmental performance as a
competitive weapon against other firms with fewer resources or means to keep up.
VII.  CONCLUSION
                                                          
10 However, this is not a typical "equilibrium" perspective.  At equilibrium, the value of the above
investment should reflect the value of cash flow and thus should not affect Tobin's q.
11 An extension of our argument is that developing countries offer particularly attractive locations to
experiment with such “clean technology” because they are not subject to the same level of costly
“command and control” regulation that is found in developed economies such as the U.S.  Indeed, under24
This paper refutes the idea that adoption of global environmental standards by MNEs
constitutes a liability that depresses market value.  On the contrary, the evidence from our
analysis indicates that positive market valuation is associated with the adoption of a
single, stringent environmental standard around the world.
Our results imply that private valuations may incorporate negative environmental
externalities, even if the externalities take place in countries with lax environmental
regulations and poorly protected environmental property rights.  In addition, adopting
stringent environmental standards may actually be more profitable than defaulting to
lower local environmental standards.  This may be a by-product of pressures, in the
developed world, to make new technologies and equipment more environmentally
friendly.  It may also be that environmentally conscious firms are more diligent in
reducing waste and improving resource productivity.
The notion that MNE’s, as a group, pursue the lowest environmental standards
and create a “race to the bottom” among developing countries desperate for foreign
investments is not substantiated by the data.  The most common corporate environmental
practice in our sample is the opposite: adopting a stringent internal standard globally.  We
do not, however, suggest that the race to the bottom does not exist.  In fact, our findings
also suggest that companies with lower market values tend to pursue lower environmental
standards.  Perhaps, these companies opt to default to host country standards because
they lack the means to make the investment in environmentally superior technology
world-wide.  They may also be less well run companies focusing on short term cost
savings.  This might include, but is certainly not limited to, strategies such as
recapitalizing old production assets, extending obsolete product life cycles, and
exploiting low labor costs.
From a public policy standpoint, then, there are clear implications regarding these
results: Developing countries may indeed attract foreign investment by lowering
environmental standards, but the type of companies they attract by doing so will be
weaker firms not investing in state-of-the-art plant and equipment.  After a temporary
presence marked by the exploitation of the lower or poorly-enforced host country
                                                                                                                                                                            
these circumstances, it may be possible for firms to jointly optimize cost, quality, and environmental
performance.25
standards, these companies may well end up fodder for those globally competitive firms
which have adopted world-wide environmental standards and are reaping the competitive
and market benefits of that policy.  Thus, developing countries may be best served by
promoting aggressive environmental objectives combined with a willingness to work
collaboratively with the world’s leading MNEs to define and implement policies that
facilitate “win-win” environmental solutions.
While our study answers many questions concerning the relationship between
corporate environmental standards and firm value, there is still much work to be done on
this topic.  First, this study should be repeated with a longer time-frame to assess whether
higher environmental standards do, in fact, lead to better cash flow down the road.
Second, it would be desirable to seek a more fine-grained measure of companies’
presence in developing countries.  Currently, we have only a binary measure of this
variable.  This makes our tests overly conservative in that a company that has only one
plant in a country with low environmental standards is treated the same as one that has
substantially all of its production in such jurisdictions.  We would not expect the market
to treat these companies in the same way.  Third, future research should seek to identify
the motivation behind changes in environmental standards.26
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Table I: Means and correlations for the dependent and independent variables
Mean
(std dev)
Env. Std. R&D Adv. Leverage %Foreign Log(Size)
Tobin's q 3.5265
(2.7227)
0.36718
(0.0001)
0.46748
(0.0001)
0.44195
(0.0001)
-0.21117
(0.0001)
0.09618
(0.0792)
-0.00690
(0.9000)
Env. Std. 2.3144
(0.8733)
0.27956
(0.0001)
0.22858
(0.0001)
-0.12908
(0.0183)
0.07810
(0.1544)
0.23186
(0.0001)
R&D 0.0407
(0.0388)
0.07109
(0.0001)
-0.39491
(0.0001)
0.29115
(0.0001)
-0.06263
0.2537
Adv. 0.0205
(0.0345)
-0.03774
(0.4919)
0.11020
(0.0442)
-0.05412
(0.3241)
Leverage 0.1683
(0.0929)
-0.14529
(0.0078)
0.04351
(0.4281)
% Foreign 0.3280
(0.1531)
0.08728
(0.1113)
Log(assets) 9.1414
(1.2464)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values.31
Table II: t-tests comparing means at different environmental standards
Standard N Tobin's Q R&D Advertising Leverage % Foreign Log(assets)
Host 30 2.1986
(0.8874)
0.0249
(0.0280)
0.0119
(0.0234)
0.1870
(0.0844)
0.3418
(0.1585)
8.9421
(1.0523)
U.S. 18 2.5317
(1.2917)
0.0407
(0.0396)
0.0154
(0.0346)
0.1142***
(0.0724)
0.2703
(0.1376)
8.4871
(1.1890)
Internal 56 4.1475***
(2.7550)
0.0458
(0.0419)
0.0255
(0.0385)
0.1593*
(0.0901)
0.3547**
(0.1557)
9.2793**
(1.0939)
Note: The values in parentheses are standard deviations.
*, **, *** significantly different from the mean for the preceding category at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.Table III: Regressing Tobin's q on Environmental
Standards and Control Variables (Environmental
standards defined as 1, 2, 3)
No fixed effects Controlling industry
fixed effects
Intercept 1.0501
(1.4391)
R&D 27.046***
(4.8974)
21.7547***
(6.4408)
Adv 30.6467***
(4.9429)
26.0055***
(6.3677)
Leverage -0.3386
(2.0266)
-2.2390
(2.3999)
% Foreign -1.4577
(1.1423)
-1.4160
(1.3455)
Log(assets) -0.0070
(0.1551)
-0.0178
(0.1981)
Environmental. Std 0.53485***
(0.1993)
0.4523**
(0.2120)
N 104 104
R
2 0.5174 0.5953
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively33
Table IV: Piece-wise linear regression of Tobin's q on
Environmental Standards and Control Variables
No fixed effects Controlling
industry fixed
effects
Intercept 2.65871*
(1.5040)
R&D 26.6656***
(4.8638)
21.7786***
(6.3908)
Adv 30.3327***
(4.8180)
25.7406***
(6.3206)
Leverage -1.5247
(2.0727)
-2.9432
(2.4260)
% Foreign -1.8842
(0.1418)
-1.7561
(1.3537)
Log(assets) -0.0620
(0.1548)
-0.0439
(0.1879)
ED 1 (U.S. vs. host
country)
-0.4697
(0.4817)
-0.3215
(0.5516)
ED 2 (internal vs U.S.
standard)
1.4497***
(0.4817)
1.1656**
(0.5148)
N 104 104
R
2 0.5382 0.6063
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively
ED1 = 1 if corporate environmental standard is "U.S.
standards" or "internal standards that exceeds any
national standards;" 0 elsewhere.
ED2 = 1 if corporate environmental standard is "internal
standards that exceeds any national standards;" 0
elsewhere.34
Table Va: Residual for predicted Tobin's q  regressed on lagged residuals of Tobin’s
q and Environmental Standards.  In all regressions, industry and time fixed effects
are controlled for.
Model I Model II Model III
Residual of
Tobin's q (t-1)
1.2276***
(0.0697)
1.2462***
(0.1084)
1.3516***
(0.1205)
Residual of
Tobin's q (t-2)
0.0023
(0.1569)
0.2572
(0.2212)
Residual of
Tobin's q (t-3)
-0.7325***
(0.1790)
Residual of Env
Std (t-1)
-0.09054
(0.0903)
-0.1892
(0.1251)
-0.2026
(0.1691)
Residual of Env
Std (t-2)
0.1554
(0.1150)
-0.1333
(0.1743)
Residual of Env
Std (t-3)
0.0549
(0.1969)
N 252 162 72
R
2 .8856 .9011 .9375
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively35
Table Vb: Residual for predicted Environmental Standards regressed on lagged
residuals of Tobin’s q and Environmental Standards.  In all regressions, industry
and time fixed effects are controlled for.
Model I Model II Model III
Residual of
Tobin’s-q (t-1)
0.0058
(0.0078)
0.0159
(0.0223)
-0.0119
(0.0166)
Residual of
Tobin’s-q (t-2)
-0.0239
(0.0294)
-0.0271
(0.0374)
Residual of
Tobin’s-q (t-3)
0.0226
(0.0406)
Residual of Env
Std (t-1)
0.7674***
(0.0501)
0.6391***
(0.1173)
0.7127***
(0.1511)
Residual of Env
Std (t-2)
0.1875*
(0.1059)
0.1129
(0.1206)
Residual of Env
Std (t-3)
-0.0275
(0.0707)
N 252 162 72
R
2 0.6791 0.7264 0.7947
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively36
Appendix A: Validation of IRRC Environmental Standard Measure
In this study, the focal independent variable Environmental Standard (ENV STD),
was derived from the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC) Corporate
Environmental Profile.  The variable is a record of each corporation’s declared stance
regarding its international environmental standard: (1) the corporation adheres to local
standards only;  (2) the corporation applies US environmental standards wherever it does
business; and (3) the corporation has its own internal environmental standard that exceeds
any national standards.  The assumption is that firms declaring a lower category of
environmental standard are poorer environmental performers.
This assumption requires validation. Full scale validation is difficult because
consistent and reliable pollution data at the plant level on a global scale does not exist,
especially in developing countries.  We therefore resorted to validating this assumption
based on each firm's US "Toxic Release Inventory" (TRI), as reported in 1995
12.  The
IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Center) tracks US plants' TRI (in weight) and
reports for each company its ratio of toxic releases to sales and industry averages.  We
first formed a variable, "relative emission," which is the difference between a firm's US
toxic release/sales and industry average.  We then examined how "relative emission"
varies with a company's declared environmental standard.  To ascertain that robustness in
our results, we trim outliers that have student residual greater than or equal to three.
Table A1 reports the mean "relative emission" by each declared class of
environmental standard.  We find that firms that "default to local environmental
standards" pollute more than an average firm in their industry, while the opposite is true
for firms that claim to apply "US environmental standards" or an "internal stringent
global standard," the last one being most statistically significant.
The ranking of the average "relative emission" follows our intuition.  While the
average "relative emission" of firms that apply the "US standards" seems to be the lowest,
it is affected by one outlier.  When the outlier is deleted, the average "relative emission"
of the category retains only half of the reported magnitude.  The ranking of the average
                                                          
12  We have data for both 1994 and 1995.  Using 1994 data generates similarly results that are slightly less
significant but are still acceptable at conventional level.  We chose to use the 1995 data because our records
on corporate environmental standard for 1995 are more complete.37
"relative emission" then follow our intuition: firms that "default to host country
environmental standards" have the highest relative emissions and firms that apply an
"internal stringent global standard" have the lowest relative emissions.  The average
relative emission of firms that "default to local environmental standards" is statistically
significantly higher than that of firms that apply "an internal stringent global standard,"
but not statistically significantly above those that apply "the US standard."  The average
"relative emission" of firms that apply the "US standard" is higher than the same average
for firms that apply "an internal global standard."
We conducted a regression analysis.  Notice that we did not need to control for
industry wide effects because fixed industry effects have already been filtered out of the
pollution measure by subtracting from it its industry mean.  We controlled for firm size
(log of total dollars of assets) because of possible economies (or diseconomies) of scale
in "polluting".  The regression results are reported in Table A2.  The results are consistent
with those in Table A1: (i) firms that "default to local environmental standards" pollute
statistically significantly more than firms that apply "an internal global standard;" (ii)
firms that "default to local environmental standards" pollute more than firms that apply
"US standards," but the difference is not statistically significant; and (iii) firms that apply
"US standards" pollute more than firms that apply "an internal global standard," but the
difference is not statistically significant.
While the tests are relatively simple, they provide evidence that the companies
using a global environmental standard are relatively cleaner in the United States than
those companies using host country standards abroad.  Notice that the results only include
U.S. data.  Companies that use host country standards around the world can, by
definition, export their dirtiest processes to lax jurisdictions, which is an option that is
rejected by companies using a global standard.  Thus, finding that the globally integrated
strategy is associated with lower emissions in the U.S. supports our stance that the self-
reported data are valid and meaningful.38
Table A1: Means, correlation and t-test on Relative Emission
Declared environmental standard
----------------------------------------
Relative Emission
Default to Host
standards
Apply US standard Apply an internal
stringent global
standard
Mean (standard  error of the mean) 0.010
(0.1297)
-0.2691
(0.2033)
-0.4269***
(0.1375)
t- and prob-value when comparing to
"default to host country standards"
-- -1.578
(.125)
-2.368**
(.021)
t- and prob-value when compared to
"applying US standard"
-- -- .167
(.868)
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  In the first row, the results
indicate whether the sample mean differs significantly from 0.39
Table A2 Regression of Relative Emissions in 1995 on Environmental
Standard and on dummies indicating US standards and global
standards
A2-1 A2-2
Intercept -1.588**
(.666)
-1.857**
(.723)
Environmental Standard (1,2 or 3) -.342***
(0.111)
--
US Standards
Overseas
 -- -.418
(0.307)
Internal Global
Standard
-- -.687***
(0.224)
Log (Assets) .230***
(0.076)
.223***
(0.08)
N8 2 8 2
R-square (Adjusted) 0.133 0.123
*, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively
The overall model is significant at the 5% level (F-value = 2.728)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.